Selected References on Non-Communicable Diseases, Corporate Practices and Health Published after 2010

This bibliography and list of organizations is an effort to identify in one place recent scholarship, reports and organizations documenting the role of corporations in health and disease with a specific focus on non-communicable diseases.  It was compiled by participants in the September 2018 Workshop on Corporations, Health and Non-Communicable Diseases at the CUNY Graduate School of Public Health in New York City, timed to coincide with the Third UN High-Level Meeting on NCDs and was subsequently updated(late 2019)  by another group of 12 academics working on commercial determinants of health convened by Kelley Lee at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver and Nicholas Freudenberg at City University of New York.

Publications and Reports 

  1. Barlow P, McKee M,  Basu S, Stuckler D. Impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on high-fructose corn syrup supply in Canada: a natural experiment using synthetic control methods. CMAJ. 2017; 189(26):E881-7.
  2. Barlow P, McKee M, Basu S, Stuckler D. The health impact of trade and investment agreements: a quantitative systematic review and network co-citation analysis Globalization and health. 2017; 13 (1) 13.
  3. Barlow P, Serôdio P, Ruskin G, McKee M, Stuckler D. Science organisations and Coca-Cola’s ‘war’ with the public health community: insights from an internal industry document. J Epidemiol Community Health. 2018;72(9):761-3.
  4. Barquera S, Sanchez K, Carriedo A, Swinburn B. The development of a national obesity and diabetes prevention and control strategy in Mexico: actors, actions and conflicts of interest, pp. 18-30, in Mwatsama, M, ed. UK Health Forum’s Public health and the food and drinks industry: The governance and ethics of interaction.  UK Health Forum, 2018. 
  5. Baum FE, Sanders DM, Fisher M, Anaf J, Freudenberg N, Friel S, Labonté R, London L, Monteiro C, Scott-Samuel A, Sen A. Assessing the health impact of transnational corporations: its importance and a framework. Globalization and Health. 2016;12(1):27.
  6. Baum FE, Margaret Anaf J. Transnational corporations and health: a research agenda. Int J Health Serv. 2015;45(2):353–362.
  7. Benatar S, Upshur R, Gill S. Understanding the relationship between ethics, neoliberalism and power as a step towards improving the health of people and our planet. The Anthropocene Review. 2018; 1–22.
  8. Bodker M, Pisinger C, Toft U, Jorgensen T. The rise and fall of the world’s first fat tax. Health Policy. 2015 Jun; 119(6):737-42.
  9. Brezis M, Wiist WH. Vulnerability of health to market forces. Med Care. 2011;49(3):232-239. doi:10.1097/MLR.0b013e31820ab638
  10. Brown T. Legislative Capture: A critical consideration in the commercial determinants of public health. Journal of Law and Medicine. 2019;26(4):764-85.
  11. Brown K, Rundall P, Lobstein T, Mwatsana M, Jeffery B. Conflicts of Interest Coalition. 2011. http://www.infactcanada.ca/pdf/conflicts-of-interest-statement.pdf.  
  12. Brown K, Rundall P, Lobstein T, Mwatsana M, Jeffery B, 61 signatories; a full list of signatories is available in the appendix. Open letter to WHO DG candidates: keep policy and priority setting free of commercial influence. Lancet. 2017;389(10082):1879. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(17)31146-7
  13. Burch T, Wander N, Collin J. Uneasy money: the Instituto Carlos Slim de la Salud, tobacco philanthropy and conflict of interest in global health. Tob Control. 2010; 19(6):e1-9. 
  14. Burlandy L, Alexandre VP, Gomes F, Castro IRR, Dias PC, Henriques P, Carvalho CMP, Castro Jr P. Health promotion policies and potential conflicts of interest involving the commercial private sector. Ciênc. saúde coletiva [Internet]. 2016; 21( 6 ): 1809-1818.
  15. Buse K, Tanaka S, Hawkes S. Healthy people and healthy profits? Elaborating a conceptual framework for governing the commercial determinants of non-communicable diseases and identifying options for reducing risk exposure. Globalization and Health. 2017;13(1):34. 
  16. Campbell M Gretler C. Nestlé Wants to Sell You Both Sugary Snacks and Diabetes Pills. Bloomberg.com. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-05-05/nestl-s-sugar-empire-is-on-a-health-kick. May 5, 2016. 
  17. Campbell N, Willis KJ, Arthur G, Jeffery B, Robertson HL, Lorenzetti DL. Federal government food policy committees and the financial interests of the food sector. Open Med. 2013;7(4):e107-111.
  18. Carriedo A, Mena C., Nieto C., Alcalde J., Barquera S. Participation of non-state actors in developing a food labelling policy in Mexico. In Mwatsama, M, ed., Public health and the food and drinks industry: The governance and ethics of interaction. UK Health Forum, January 2018.
  19. Clapp J, Scrinis G. Big food, nutritionism, and corporate power. Globalizations. 2017;14(4):578-95.
  20. Clapp J. Financialization, distance and global food politics. Journal of Peasant Studies. 2014; 41(5):797-814.
  21. Collin J, Hill S. Epidemics, industries and inequalities: The commercial sector as a structural driver of inequalities in non-communicable diseases. Ch 13. In: Smith K, Bambra C, Hill S (eds). Health Inequalities: Critical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 2016.
  22. Collin J, Hill SE, Kandlik Eltanani M, Plotnikova E, Ralston R, Smith KE. Can public health reconcile profits and pandemics? An analysis of attitudes to commercial sector engagement in health policy and research.PLoS One. 2017; 12(9):e0182612.
  23. Collins T, Mikkelsen B, Axelrod S. Interact, engage or partner? Working with the private sector for the prevention and control of noncommunicable diseases. Cardiovascular Diagnosis and Therapy. 2018 . http://cdt.amegroups.com/article/view/20806/20503 
  24. Conflict of Interest Coalition. Joint-statement of the Conflict of Interest Coalition at the 2014 United Nations High Level Meeting on the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Disease in New York City. 2014. http://healthscienceandlaw.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/UN.Conflict-of-interest-safeguards.Health-trump-trade.July2014.pdf. Accessed November 16, 2018.
  25. Crosbie E, Glantz SA. Tobacco industry argues domestic trademark laws and international treaties preclude cigarette health warning labels, despite consistent legal advice that the argument is invalid. Tob Control. 2014;23:e7.
  26. Crosbie E, Sosa P, Glantz SA. Defending strong tobacco packaging and labelling regulations in uruguay: transnational tobacco control network versus philip morris international. Tob Control. 2018;27:185-194. 
  27. Drutman L. The Business of America Is Lobbying: How Corporations Became Politicized and Politics Became More Corporate. 1 edition. Oxford ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 2015.
  28. Fabbri A, Lai A, Grundy Q, Bero LA. The Influence of Industry Sponsorship on the Research Agenda: A Scoping Review. American Journal of Public Health. 2018;108(11):e9-16.
  29. Fooks G, Gilmore A, Collin J, Holden C, Lee K. The Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility: Techniques of Neutralization, Stakeholder Management and Political CSR. J Bus Ethics. 2013;112(2):283-299. doi:10.1007/s10551-012-1250-5
  30. Fooks GJ, Smith J, Lee K, Holden C. Controlling corporate influence in health policy making? An assessment of the implementation of article 5.3 of the World Health Organization framework convention on tobacco control. Globalization and Health. 2017;13(1):12. doi:10.1186/s12992-017-0234-8
  31. Forsyth S, Odierna DH, Krauth D and Bero L.  Conflicts of interest and critiques of the use of systematic reviews in policymaking: An analysis of opinion articles.  Systematic Reviews, 2014; 18(3)(1):122. 
  32. Franz C, Kickbusch I. The Capital NCD-Nexus: The Commercial Determinants of Health and Global Capital Flows  Eurohealth 2018;24(3): 21-25.
  33. Friel S, Baker P, Thow A, Gleeson D, Townsend B, Schram A. An expose of the realpolitik of trade negotiations: implications for population nutrition. Public Health Nutrition. 2019; 22:16; 3083-3091.
  34. Friel S, Gleeson D, Thow A-M, et al. A new generation of trade policy: potential risks to diet-related health from the trans pacific partnership agreement. Global Health. 2013;9(1):46.
  35. Friel S, Ponnamperuma S, Schram A, Gleeson D, Kay A, Thow AM, Labonte R. Shaping the discourse: What has the food industry been lobbying for in the Trans Pacific Partnership trade agreement and what are the implications for dietary health? Critical Public Health. 2016; 26(5): 518-529.
  36. Freudenberg N. Lethal But Legal: Corporations, Consumption, and Protecting Public Health. Reprint edition. New York: Oxford University Press; 2014 , Paperback 2016.
  37. Freudenberg N. The manufacture of lifestyle: The role of corporations in unhealthy living. Journal of public health policy. 2012 May 1;33(2):244-56.
  38. Freudenberg N. Impact of Business and Corporate Practices on Health. The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Health, Illness, Behavior, and Society. 2014 Jan 6:1221-3.
  39. Freudenberg N. Defining Appropriate Roles for Corporations in Public Health Research and Practice. Am J Public Health. 2018;108(11):1440-1441
  40. Gálvez A. Eating NAFTA: Trade, Food Policies, and the Destruction of Mexico. First edition. Oakland, California: University of California Press; 2018. 
  41. Garde A, Jeffery B, Rigby N. Implementing the WHO Recommendations whilst Avoiding Real, Perceived or Potential Conflicts of Interest. European Journal of Risk Regulation. 2017;8(2):237-250. doi:10.1017/err.2017.22
  42. General Assembly Executive Board 142/23, Safeguarding against possible conflicts of interest in nutrition programmes. 2017. http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB142/B142_23-en.pdf. 
  43. General Assembly Resolution 66/2, Political Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of The General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases. 2012. http://www.who.int/nmh/events/un_ncd_summit2011/political_declaration_en.pdf. 
  44. Gill S, Benatar SR. Global Health Governance and Global Power: A critical commentary on the lancet university of oslo commission report. International Journal of Health Services. 2016; 46 (2).
  45. Gilens M, Page BI. Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens. Perspectives on Politics. 2014;12(3):564-581. 
  46. Gilmore AB, Savell E, Collin J. Public health, corporations and the new responsibility deal: promoting partnerships with vectors of disease? J Public Health (Oxf). 2011;33(1):2-4.
  47. Gleeson D, Labonté R. Commodities Harmful to Health. In. Trade Agreements and Public Health. 2020; pp. 67-92. Palgrave Pivot, Singapore.
  48. Gleeson D, Lexchin J, Labonté, R. et al. Analyzing the impact of trade and investment agreements on pharmaceutical policy: provisions, pathways and potential impacts. Global Health. 2019;15 (78).
  49. Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of NCDs 2013-2020. World Health Organization; 2013. http://www.who.int/nmh/events/ncd_action_plan/en/.  
  50. Gomes F. Conflicts of interests in food and nutrition. Cadernos de Saúde Pública, 2015; 31(10), 2039-2046.
  51. Goyder E, Blank L, Baxter S, van Schalkwyk MC. Tackling gambling related harms as a public health issue. The Lancet Public Health. 2020; 1;5(1):e14-5. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(19)30243-9.
  52. Granheim SI, Engelhardt K, Rundall P, Bialous S, Iellamo A, Margetts B. Interference in public health policy: examples of how the baby food industry uses tobacco industry tactics. 1. 2017;8(2):288-310. 
  53. Hawkes C, Baker P, Thow AM, Parkhurst J, Walls H, Wingrove K, Demaio A. What drives political commitment for nutrition? A review and framework synthesis to inform the United Nations Decade of Action on Nutrition. BMJ Global Health. 2018;3(1).
  54. Hawkins B, Holden C, Eckhardt J, and Lee K. Reassessing policy paradigms: A comparison of the global tobacco and alcohol industries. Global Public Health. 2018; 13(1):1-19.
  55. Hiscock R, Branston JR, McNeill A, Hitchman SC, Partos TR, Gilmore AB. Tobacco industry strategies undermine government tax policy: evidence from commercial data. Tob Control. 2017;27(5):488–97. 
  56. Holden C, Lee K, Gilmore A, Fooks G, Wander N. Trade policy, health, and corporate influence: British American tobacco and China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. Int J Health Serv. 2010;40(3):421-441. doi:10.2190/HS.40.3.c
  57. Ireland R, Bunn C, Reith G, et al. Commercial determinants of health: advertising of alcohol and unhealthy foods during sporting events. Bull World Health Organ. 2019;97(4):290–295. doi:10.2471/BLT.18.220087
  58. Jacobs A. Opposition to Breast-Feeding Resolution by U.S. Stuns World Health Officials. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/health/world-health-breastfeeding-ecuador-trump.html. 2018. 
  59. Jeffery B. Wounded by sodium levels: where the rub is. Can Nurse. 2010;106(1):44.
  60. Kadandale S, Marten R, Smith R. The palm oil industry and noncommunicable diseases. Bull World Health Organ. 2019;97(2):118–128. doi:10.2471/BLT.18.220434
  61. Kelly B. et al. Global benchmarking of children’s exposure to television advertising of unhealthy foods and beverages across 22 countries. Obesity Reviews. 2019;20:S2 doi: 10.1111/obr.12840
  62. Kenworthy N, Australia RML in HSMU, University KLP and T 1 CRCSF, eds. Case Studies on Corporations and Global Health Governance: Impacts, Influence and Accountability. 1 edition. Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar: Rowman & Littlefield International; 2016.
  63. Kenworthy N. Crowdfunding and global health disparities: an exploratory conceptual and empirical analysis. Globalization and Health. 2019; 15(1):71.
  64. Kickbusch I, Allen L, Franz C. The commercial determinants of health. The Lancet Global Health. 2016;4(12):e895-6.
  65. Knai C, Petticrew M, Mays N, Capewell S, Cassidy R, Cummins S, Eastmure E, Fafard P, Hawkins B, Jensen JD, Katikireddi SV. Systems thinking as a framework for analyzing commercial determinants of health. The Milbank Quarterly. 2018; 96(3):472-498.
  66. Kraak V, Rincon-Gallardo P, Sacks G. An accountability evaluation for the International Food & Beverage Alliance’s Global Policy on Marketing Communications to Children to reduce obesity: A narrative review to inform policy. Obes Rev. 2019;20(2):90-106. doi: 10.1111/obr.12859.
  67. Lacey C, Clark B, Frewer L, Kuznesof S. “Reaching its limits”: Industry perspectives on salt reduction”. British Food Journal. 2016; 118(7): 1610-1624. doi: 10.1108/BFJ-01-2016-0027.
  68. Lee K, Eckhardt J, Holden C. Tobacco industry globalization and global health governance: towards an interdisciplinary research agenda. Palgrave Communications. 2016;2:16037. doi:10.1057/palcomms.2016.37
  69. Lee K, Hawkins B, eds. Researching Corporations and Global Health Governance: An Interdisciplinary Guide. 1 edition. London; New York: Rowman & Littlefield International; 2016.
  70. Lee K, Smith J. The role of business in global health politics. In McInnes C, Lee K, Youde J, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Global Health Politics. Oxford University Press; 2018. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190456818.001.0001
  71. Lencucha R, Thow AM. How neoliberalism is shaping the supply of unhealthy commodities and what this means for NCD prevention. International journal of health policy and management. 2019;8(9):514.
  72. Lie AL, Granheim SI. Multistakeholder partnerships in global nutrition governance: protecting public interest? Tidsskrift for Den norske legeforening. 2017;137(22). doi:10.4045/tidsskr.17.0627
  73. Lincoln P, Rundall P, Jeffery B, et al. Conflicts of interest and the UN high-level meeting on non-communicable diseases. Lancet. 2011;378(9804):e6. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(11)61463-3
  74. Lundh A, Lexchin J, Mintzes B, Schroll JB, Bero L. Industry sponsorship and research outcome. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 2017; 2. Art. No.: MR000033. DOI: 10.1002/14651858.MR000033.pub3.
  75. Maani HN,  Knai C , Gallopel-Morvan K, Petticrew M,  Landreat MG. Stakeholder Framing of Advertising Legislation: An Analysis of Media and Parliamentary Representations of the Loi Évin in the United Kingdom. Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs. 2018;79:(4)532-538.
  76. Maani HN, G Ruskin, M McKee, D Stuckler. Public Meets Private: Conversations Between Coca-Cola and the CDC. Milbank Quarterly. 2019; 97:74-90.
  77. Maani HN, Collin J, Friel S, et al. Bringing the commercial determinants of health out of the shadows: a review of how the commercial determinants are represented in conceptual frameworks European Journal of Public Health. 2020; ckz197,https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/ckz197
  78. Mackenbach JP. Political determinants of health. Eur J Public Health. 2014;24(1):2
  79. Madureira Lima J, Galea S. Corporate practices and health: a framework and mechanisms. Global Health. 2018;14(1):21. 
  80. Madureira Lima J, Galea S. The Corporate Permeation Index – A tool to study the macrosocial determinants of non-communicable disease. SSM Popul Health. 2019;7:100361.
  81. Mandrioli D, Kearns CE, Bero LA  Relationship between Research Outcomes and Risk of Bias, Study Sponsorship, and Author Financial Conflicts of Interest in Reviews of the Effects of Artificially Sweetened Beverages on Weight Outcomes: A Systematic Review of Reviews. PLoS ONE, 2016, 11(9): e0162198. 
  82. Marks JH. Caveat Partner: Sharing Responsibility for Health With the Food Industry. Am J Public Health. 2017;107(3):360-361. 
  83. Marks, J.H. The Perils of Partnership: Industry Influence, Institutional Integrity, and Public Health. Oxford University Press, forthcoming; 2019.
  84. Marks JH. Toward a systemic ethics of public-private partnerships related to food and health. Kennedy Inst Ethics J. 2014;24(3):267-299.
  85. McCambridge J, Kypri K, Sheldon TA, Madden M, Babor TF. Advancing public health policy making through research on the political strategies of alcohol industry actors. Journal of Public Health, fdz031. 2019. https://doi.org/10.1093/pubmed/fdz031
  86. McKee M, Stuckler D. Revisiting the corporate and commercial determinants of health. American Journal of Public Health. 2018;108(9):1167-70.
  87. McNeill D, Barlow P, Birkbeck CD,  Fukuda-Parr S, Grover A, Schrecker T. Trade and investment agreements: Implications for health protection. Journal of World Trade. 2017;51 (1):159-182.
  88. Mialon M, Swinburn B, Sacks G. A proposed approach to systematically identify and monitor the corporate political activity of the food industry with respect to public health using publicly available information. Obes Rev. 2015;16(7):519-530. 
  89. Mialon M, Swinburn B, Allender S, Sacks G. Systematic examination of publicly-available information reveals the diverse and extensive corporate political activity of the food industry in Australia. BMC Public Health. 2016;16:283. doi:10.1186/s12889-016-2955-7
  90. Millar JS. The corporate determinants of health: how big business affects our health, and the need for government action! Can J Public Health. 2013;104:e327-9.
  91. Mindell JS, Reynolds L, Cohen DL, McKee M. All in this together: the corporate capture of public health. BMJ. 2012;345:e8082. 
  92. Mitchell G, Lesch M, McCambridge J. Alcohol industry involvement in the moderate alcohol and cardiovascular health trial. American Journal of Public Health. 2020;110(4):485-8.
  93. Monteiro CA, Cannon G, Moubarac J-C, Levy RB, Louzada MLC, Jaime PC. The UN Decade of Nutrition, the NOVA food classification and the trouble with ultra-processing. Public Health Nutr. 2018;21(1):5-17. 
  94. Monteiro CA, Cannon G, Moubarac J-C, Levy RB, Louzada MLC, Jaime PC. Ultra-processing. An odd “appraisal.” Public Health Nutr. 2018;21(3):497-501. 
  95. Monteiro CA, Cannon G, Levy R, et al. NOVA. The star shines bright. 1. 2016;7(1-3):28-38.
  96. Monteiro CA, Moubarac J-C, Cannon G, Ng SW, Popkin B. Ultra-processed products are becoming dominant in the global food system. Obes Rev. 2013;14 Suppl 2:21-28. 
  97. Moodie R, Stuckler D, Monteiro C, et al. Profits and pandemics: prevention of harmful effects of tobacco, alcohol, and ultra-processed food and drink industries. The Lancet. 2013;381(9867):670-679. 
  98. Moubarac J-C, Parra DC, Cannon G, Monteiro CA. Food Classification Systems Based on Food Processing: Significance and Implications for Policies and Actions: A Systematic Literature Review and Assessment. Curr Obes Rep. 2014;3(2):256-272. 
  99. Mozaffarian D. Conflict of Interest and the Role of the Food Industry in Nutrition Research. JAMA. 2017;317(17):1755-1756. 
  100. Naik Y, Baker P, Walker I, et al. Correction to: The macro-economic determinants of health and health inequalities-umbrella review protocol. Syst Rev. 2019;8(1):233. 
  101. Nestle M. Soda Politics: Taking on Big Soda. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press; 2015.
  102.  Nestle M. Unsavory Truths How Food Companies Skew the Science of What We Eat. New York: Basic Books, 2018. 
  103. Odierna, D, Forsyth, S, White, J and Bero, L. The cycle of bias in health research: A framework and toolbox for critical appraisal training.  Accountability in Research. 2013; 20:2, 127-141. 
  104. Open Letter to the United Nations endorsed by 50 groups and experts representing more than 1,300 organizations worldwide. September 2018. http://healthscienceandlaw.ca/open-letter-to-the-united-nations-endorsed-by-50-groups-and-experts-representing-more-than-1300-organizations-worldwide/. Accessed November 16, 2018.
  105. Palmedo PC, Dorfman L, Garza S, Murphy E, Freudenberg N. Countermarketing alcohol and unhealthy food: An effective strategy for preventing noncommunicable diseases? Lessons from tobacco. Annual review of public health. 2017; 20;38:119-44.
  106. Parra DC, de Sá TH, Monteiro CA, Freudenberg N. Automobile, construction and entertainment business sector influences on sedentary lifestyles. Health promotion international. 2016;33(2):239-49.
  107. Petticrew M, Maani Hessari N, Knai C, Weiderpass E. The strategies of alcohol industry SAPROs: Inaccurate information, misleading language and the use of confounders to downplay and misrepresent the risk of cancer. Drug Alcohol Rev. 2018;37(3):313–315. 
  108. Philips D, Whannel G. The Trojan Horse: The Growth of Commercial Sponsorship. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic; 2013.
  109. Planet Fat Series, New York Times, 2017 and 2018.  https://www.nytimes.com/series/obesity-epidemic 
  110. Popkin BM, Hawkes C. Sweetening of the global diet, particularly beverages: patterns, trends, and policy responses. The Lancet Diabetes & Endocrinology. 2016 ;4(2):174-86.
  111. Proctor RN. Golden Holocaust: Origins of the Cigarette Catastrophe and the Case for Abolition. First edition. Berkeley: University of California Press; 2012.
  112. Public Health and the Food and Drinks Industry: The Governance and Ethics of Interaction. Lessons from Research, Policy and Practice. London: UK Health Forum; 2018:150.
  113. Raine KD, Ferdinands AR, Atkey K, et al. Policy recommendations for front-of-package, shelf, and menu labelling in Canada: Moving towards consensus. Can J Public Health. 2017;108(4):e409-e413. doi:10.17269/cjph.108.6076
  114. Roberts EFS. What Gets Inside: Violent Entanglements and Toxic Boundaries in Mexico City. Cul Anth. 2017;32(4):592-619. doi:10.14506/ca32.4.07
  115. Rochford C, Tenneti N, Moodie R. Reframing the impact of business on health: the interface of corporate, commercial, political and social determinants of health. BMJ Glob Health. 2019;4(4):e001510. 
  116. Sacks G, Vanderlee L, Robinson E, Vandevijvere S, Cameron AJ, Ni Mhurchu C, Lee A, Ng SH, Karupaiah T, Vergeer L, L’Abbé M, Swinburn B. BIA-Obesity (Business Impact Assessment-Obesity and population-level nutrition): A tool and process to assess food company policies and commitments related to obesity prevention and population nutrition at the national level. Obes Rev. 2019; doi: 10.1111/obr.12878.
  117. Sacks G, Swinburn BA, Cameron AJ, Ruskin G. How food companies influence evidence and opinion–straight from the horse’s mouth. Critical Public Health. 2018;28(2):253-6.
  118. Schram A, Goldman S. Paradigm Shift: New Ideas for a Structural Approach to NCD Prevention Comment on “How Neoliberalism Is Shaping the Supply of Unhealthy Commodities and What This Means for NCD Prevention”. Int J Health Policy Manag. 2020;9(3):124–127. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2019.105.
  119. Schram A, Aisbett E, Baum F, Friel S. Toxic trade: the impact of preferential trade agreements on alcohol imports from Australia in partner countries. Addiction. 2019; doi: 10.1111/add.14925 [Epub ahead of print].
  120. Scott C, Carriedo A, Knai C. The Influence of Food Industry on Public Health Governance: Insights from Mexico and the United States. In: Kenworthy N, Mackenzie R, Lee K, eds. Case Studies on Corporations and Global Health Governance. Rowman & Littlefield. 2016. 
  121. Scott C, Hawkins B, Knai C. Food and beverage product reformulation as a corporate political strategy. Social Science & Medicine. 2017;172:37-45.
  122. Scrinis G. Nutritionism: The Science and Politics of Dietary Advice. New York: Columbia University Press; 2013.
  123. Sharfstein JM, Silver DL. Relationship Between the American Academy of Pediatrics and Infant Formula Companies. JAMA Pediatr. 2017;171(7):613-614. 
  124. Simon M. And Now a Word From Our Sponsors. EatDrinkPolitics; 2013:51.
  125. Smith E. Corporate image and public health: an analysis of the Philip Morris, Kraft, and Nestlé websites. J Health Commun. 2012;17(5):582-600. 
  126. Smith KE, Fooks G, Gilmore AB, Collin J, Weishaar H. Corporate coalitions and policy making in the European Union: how and why British American Tobacco promoted “Better Regulation”.  J Health Polit Policy Law. 2015;40(2):325-72. 
  127. Smith K, Dorfman L, Freudenberg N, Hawkins B, Hilton S, Razum O, Weishaar H. Tobacco, Alcohol, and processed Food industries–Why Do public Health practitioners View Them So Differently? Frontiers in Public Health. 2016;11;4:64.
  128. Smith J. Towards Critical Analysis of the Political Determinants of Health; Comment on “How Neoliberalism Is Shaping the Supply of Unhealthy Commodities and What This Means for NCD Prevention”. International Journal of Health Policy and Management. 2020 Mar 1;9(3):121-3.
  129. Stuckler D, Nestle M. Big Food, Food Systems, and Global Health. PLOS Medicine. 2012;9(6):e1001242. 
  130. Thow AM, Snowdon W, Labonté R, Gleeson D, Stuckler D, Hattersley L, et al. Will the next generation of preferential trade and investment agreements undermine prevention of noncommunicable diseases? A prospective policy analysis of the trans Pacific partnership agreement. Health Policy. 2015;119(1):88–96. 
  131. Townsend B, Schram A, Labonté R, Baum F, Friel S. ‘How do actors with asymmetrical power assert authority in policy agenda-setting? A study of authority claims by health actors in trade policy’. Social Science and Medicine. 2019; 236: 112430.
  132. Townsend B, Schram A, Baum F, Labonté R, Friel S. How does policy framing enable or constrain inclusion of social determinants of health and health equity on trade policy agendas?. Critical Public Health. 2018;30(1):115-26.
  133. Ulucanlar S, Fooks GJ, Gilmore AB. The Policy Dystopia Model: An Interpretive Analysis of Tobacco Industry Political Activity. PLOS Medicine. 2016;13(9):e1002125. 
  134. Urban G. Corporations and Citizenship. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; 2014. http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15241.html. Accessed November 16, 2018.
  135. Vallgårda S, Holm L, Jensen J. The Danish tax on saturated fat: why it did not survive. Eur J Clin Nutr. 2015;69, 223–226. 
  136. Weishaar H, Amos A, Collin J. Unpacking commercial sector opposition to European smoke-free policy: lack of unity, ‘fear of association’ and harm reduction debates. Tob Control. 2016; 25(4):422-9.
  137. Weishaar H, Collin J, Smith K, Grüning T, Mandal S, Gilmore A. Global health governance and the commercial sector: a documentary analysis of tobacco company strategies to influence the WHO framework convention on tobacco control. PLoS Med. 2012;9(6):e1001249.
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